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AUCTIONS FOR TRANSFERABLE
OBJECTS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
FROM THE VEHICLE QUOTA SYSTEM
IN SINGAPORE
Winston Koh T H and David Lee K C*
This paper studies the hypothesis that auctions with resale markets result in higher prices. The
vehicle quota system introduced in Singapore in May 1990 provides the setting. The Certificates of
Entitlement (COEs) Hecessary to purchase new cars were initially transferable for all quota catego-
ries. After October 1991, COEs for four major categories became non-transferable. Our results
indicate that while the conversion to non-transferability eliminated speculation, it has also intensi-
fied competition among car distributors. Auctions for non-transferable COEs in fact led to higher
COE prices in three of the four categories.
1. THE VEHICLE QUOTA SYSTEM IN SINGAPORE
The vehicle quota system was introduced in Singapore on 1 May 1990 to directly
control the vehicle population. Such a policy of car ownership restraint is the first of its
kind to be implemented in the world. Under the system, anyone who intends to purchase
a vehicle must first obtain a certificate of entitlement (COE). Exceptions are made for
scheduled buses, school buses, emergency vehicles, trailers, diplomatic vehicles and vehi-
cles for the disabled. Initially, the quota system comprised seven car categories so that
bidders were separated into different groups based on their intended purchase.' The
categories were:
Category Engine Capacity/Usage
1. Small Car 1000 cc and below
2. Medium Car 1001-1600 cc and taxis
3. Big Car 1601-2000 cc
4. Luxury Car 2001 and above
* Both are lecturers of the Department of Business Policy, Faculty of Business Administration,
National University of Singapore, 10 Kent Ridge Crescent, Singapore 0511. An earlier version of
this paper was presented at the Symposium on Law and the Social Sciences, 7 August 1992, at the
Regional English Language Centre, Singapore. We want to thank our colleagues for discussions
on the subject, the Chief Editor and two anonymous referees of the joumal for their constructive
comments and suggestions, and the Registry of Vehicles of Singapore for providing us with the
data for this study. Financial Support from NUS Grant RP900048 is gratefully acknowledged. We
are solely responsible for the errors in the paper.
1. An 8th category, the Weekend Car, was added in May 1991. Weekend cars can only be used
during off-peak hours, weekends and public holidays.
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5. Commercial Goods vehicles and buses
6. Motorcycle Motorcycles
7. Open For use in any category
Each year, the govemment would specify a growth rate for the vehicle population,
based on prevailing traffic conditions and road capacity. At present, the rate of increase is
fixed at around 3%. This is then used to determine the quota for individual categories,
taking into account the existing car population at the end of the previous year and the
number of vehicles deregistered in the year. To allow market forces some leeway in the
mix of vehicles under the quota system, 20% of the deregistered vehicles in each category
is pooled into the Open category, with the remaining 80% being kept in their respective
categories.
The COEs of the various categories are auctioned monthly.^ To discourage specula-
tion, each bidder is allowed only one sealed bid, made either on forms obtainable from the
Registry of Vehicles (ROV), or more recently, through electronic bidding via Automated
Teller Machines (ATMs). The bidder is further required to deposit half the submitted bid
with the ROV. After the results of the auction are announced, the deposits of the unsuccess-
ful bidders are returned. Successful bidders pay the lowest successful bid, which defines
the COE premium for the particular exercise. COE holders are then required to exercise
their entitlement or transfer the COE (once only) to another party within a specified period.
Failure to exercise the COE results in forfeiture of the deposit. Unused COEs are added to
the quota for the next auction.
Under the quota system, the owner of a new vehicle can keep it for ten years. If he
wishes to keep it after ten years, he has to pay a quota premium to extend the ownership
for another ten years. The quota premium, calculated as the 12-month moving average of
COE premium, applies also to vehicles registered before the quota system was in place. A
two-year grace period was given to vehicles which were at least eight years old as at May
1990.
The first batch of COEs was auctioned in April 1990. These COEs were valid for six
months from May 1990. In response to public requests that auctions should be more
frequent, the govemment conducted COE auctions on a monthly basis from the second
auction in August 1990 onwards. The validity period of the COEs was correspondingly
reduced to three months to curb speculation. Before October 1991, COEs were transferable
once. Car distributors, who were then allowed to enter 30 bids during each auction, could
only transfer the COEs they obtained to their customers. This was another measure to deter
speculation in COEs. However, stories abound of speculators earning huge profits. In
response to public outcry to eliminate speculation, the govemment decided that COEs in
six car categories should become non-transferable for a trial period of one year from
October 1991 onwards. The exceptions were Category 5 and 7 COEs; they remained
transferable throughout the trial period.
2, From anecdotal evidence, the majority bought them from the secondary market or from distribu-
tors. Some buyers were offered discounted COEs by dealers. Others, after a few unsuccessful
bids, finally bought a COE in the resale market. It should be noted that after this study, the COEs
have become non-transferable by legislation.
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Until February 1992, 15 transferable COE auctions and five non-transferable COE
auctions had taken place. The COE premia, denoted QP, are given in Table 1 in the
Appendix. The COE prices showed marked fiuctuations, with the lows coinciding with the
Gulf War. The fluctuating COE prices were a source of unhappiness for both car buyers
and distributors. While part of the fluctuations in prices must be due to the different levels
of demand relative to the available COEs in each exercise, the public have blamed the
rising COE prices after the Gulf War on the presence of speculators, before COEs were
made non-transferable.
Many people have argued that the speculator, by placing arbitrarily high bids, has
outbid the genuine buyers (those who do not intend to resell) who, not to be outbid, were
compelled to put in higher bids, or else buy at much higher prices in the resale market. Of
course, speculators lost money too, as was the case when COE prices plunged during the
Gulf War. On average, it is fair to say that speculators have profited from transferable
COEs. The extent of the resale market can be gauged from the registration of new vehicles.
Until April 1991, out of the 32,000 vehicles registered with transferable COEs, only 5,100
or 16% of the buyers submitted COEs in their own name.
Since car distributors sold, on average, a few hundred cars a month, but were entitled
to bid for only 30 COEs, many distributors resorted to submitting bids by proxy to obtain
more COEs. The car distributors also started creating sales packages as part of the overall
marketing strategy in an attempt to maintain their market shares and promote their makes.
One popular strategy was to "subsidise" part of the COE premium. Clearly, these so-called
subsidies eroded profits and distributors attempted to pass them back to the car buyer
eventually, either through higher car prices or more expensive spare parts and maintenance
servicing. In the short term, the ability of the distributors to provide such "subsidies"
depended to a great extent on the profit margins of the makes of cars. Even after 1 October
1991, dealers continued to "subsidise" COEs by as much as 50-100%, creating an incen-
tive for car buyers to put in higher bids to secure COEs for the cars they had ordered.
Non-transferability in six categories greatly reduced bidding by proxy, but has not
eliminated it. Distributors continued to submit bids and register cars in their employees'
names when they managed to obtain the COEs. These cars are then sold as "second-hand"
cars, with a letter from the dealer certifying that the second owner is in effect the first
owner. This practice, termed double-transfer in the industry, has led to more intense market
competition among car dealers to oust rivals from the market. Also, second-hand car
dealers continued to speculate in COEs via double-transfers. They openly advertised in the
newspapers to sell their COEs through double-transfer, an indication that there are car
buyers who do not mind paying $5,000 or more, inclusive of the legal car-transfer fee of
$1,000 to $2,000, for these COEs.
2. TRANSFERABILITY AND fflGHER PRICES
The decision to make COEs in six categories non-transferable for a trial period of one
year has provided us with the opportunity to study the COE premia to see if there is any
truth in the allegation that the rapid increase in COE prices after the Gulf War and before
October 1991 was due largely to speculative activities. The trial period has since been
extended until further notice in order for the govemment to study other refinements to the
quota system.
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It is tempting to argue that bids, and hence prices, are higher under transferable
auctions simply because transferability commands a premium and therefore bidders are
willing to pay more for a transferable COE. This intuition is correct in the case of auctions
for govemment bonds and options which cannot be consumed. However, in the case of a
COE, which can be consumed (when it is exercised before expiry to purchase a car), this
intuition is incorrect. A potential car buyer, who needs a COE to complete the purchase of
his car with the distributor by participating in the auction, is definitely not willing to pay
more for a transferable COE. Similarly, distributors are not willing to pay more, because
even with non-transferable COEs, they can always bid for more COEs and register the cars
under the employees' names and sell the cars later. It is the speculator who is willing to pay
more.
Some unsuccessful bidders may not want to wait until the next auction to bid for COEs
again. For instance, if they have placed orders for cars with the distributors and their order
has arrived, they would rather buy a resale COE than wait for the next auction and face the
possibility of not winning. Other unsuccessful bidders may decide that it is too time-
consuming to gather information to prepare their bids for future auctions. These are the
people who would rather buy COEs on the secondary market and who are willing to pay
the transferability premium.'
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 3, we provide a model of the
COE auction to analyse the incentives of the speculator in bidding up the COE premia. The
model is adapted from Bikhchandani and Huang (1988), which studies the auction for
United States Govemment Treasiuy bills under the assumption of common values. We
show in our paper that when bidders' valuations of the COEs are correlated and the optimal
strategies are used, bids are higher under the transferable COEs for the same set of
information. Next in Section 4, we analyse available data to determine if the theoretical
result is bome out by the data before and after COEs were made non-transferable in
October 1991. While the average COE premium, adjusted for the intensity of demand, was
lower in some categories after October 1991, thus supporting the theory, this was not true
in other categories. We provide an explanation of the results based on the market compe-
tition among distributors.
3. OPTIMAL BroDING STRATEGY
Consider the auction for COEs in a particular category. There are n bidders competing
for k COEs. Each bidder possesses private information that influences his willingness to
pay. For example, the urgency to own a car differs across car buyers. If he has decided to
bid for a COE now rather than buy one from the resale market, his private information
would include forecasts about the COE premium and future resale COE prices. A specu-
lator's private information would be the levels of demand in the resale market. Car
3. Distributors may elect to obtain COEs from the resale market and pay the transferability premium
in order to avoid tying up the sizeable deposit and incurring interest costs when bids for COEs are
submitted. For other non-speculators, there may also be a transferability premium due to temporal
resolution of uncertainties in the time period between submitting the bid and knowing the
outcome.
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distributors, who need COEs to sell cars to buyers who are either unsuccessful or did not
participate in the auction, would have private information which would include the forecast
of COE prices, future resale prices, and their profit margins.
If COEs are non-transferable, each bidder's valuation consists of only & private value,
which refiects the value of the COE for the purpose of car purchase or car sale. If COEs
are transferable, there is an additional common value, which reflects the resale value of the
COEs. For the speculator, there is only the common-value component, since he is only
interested in the resale value.
Let X; represent a bidder's private signal, where a larger signal indicates greater
willingness to pay. Public information such as stock prices, COE resale prices, and
govemment policies that affect demand for COEs is also available to bidders when they
submit their bids. Let S be a value-estimate of these public signals. Additional public
information may be available later. An example would be the decision to implement non-
transferable COE auctions. Let P be a value-estimate of these ex post public signals.
The dollar value equivalent of a COE to bidder i, denoted V;, is assumed to be given
by:
V; = U(S, P, X, {Xj}j^ ) (1)
if he has access to all the public information, before and after bids are submitted, and other
bidder's private information. We assume that every bidder's valuation is affected by S and
P in the same way, and is a symmetric function of other bidders' signals. Furthermore, it
does not matter how private information is distributed; an assumption that is satisfied with
anonymous bidders. We assume that bidders are risk-neutral and their valuations are in
monetary units. If a bidder obtains a COE and pays the amount b, he gains Vj - b.
Let f(s, p, X,,..., x j be the joint density function, which is assumed to be symmetric
in the last n arguments. We assume that the random variables are affiliated. This means that
large values for some variables make other variables more likely to have large values than
small values (see Milgrom and Weber, 1982). Thus, if a bidder is willing to submit higher
bids in view of expected higher demand, he would expect that other bidders would also
forecast demand to be higher, and therefore that they are also prepared to put in higher bids.
We allow for the density function f (s, p, x,, ..., x,) to change over time.
TRANSFERABLE COE AUCTION
In the COE auction as practised in Singapore, successful bidders pay tjie lowest
successful bid, rather than the highest rejected bid, as is usual in uniform-price auctions.
For simplicity, we follow the literature on uniform-price auctions and consider the case
where successful bidders pay the highest rejected bid.'*
4. If the distribution of bids is approximately continuous, the lowest successful bid will be close to
the highest rejected bid, and the optimal bidding strategy for the COE auction will be similar to
that in a standard uniform-price auction. In any case, the only qualitative difference is that a
bidder will put in a bid slightly lower than his valuation if successful bidders have to pay the
lowest successful bid. This is to ensure that if he happens to be the lowest successful bidder, he
will still enjoy some consumer surplus.
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Since the bidding environment is synmietric, a common optimal bidding strategy
b*(X) exists. Suppose bidders i = 2 , . . . , n bid b*(Xi). A bidder cannot observe the other
bidders' private information when he submit his bids, but he can form estimates. Let Y,,
. . ., Y ,^ . . ., Y^i denote Bidder l's estimates of the largest, . . ., smallest private signals
among the other bidders. Suppose Bidder 1 were to ask himself the following question at
the time he submits his bid: "If I were to win a COE and am asked to sell the COE, what
would be my asking price?"
Based on his estimates of the other bidders' signals. Bidder 1 will win a COE if his bid
b exceeds b*(Yk). His asking price would be the valuation of the COE, based on the
observed ex post signal P and the COE premium, which is simply b*(Y^) where Y^ is the
kth highest among the other bidders' private signals. Since P is unknown yet, the revised
valuation r"(X,, Y,,, P) is:
r"(X,,Y,,P) = EIV,lb*-'(b)>Y,,Y,,PI (2)
where the expectation is taken over P. (The superscript" denotes uniform-price auction.)
Conditional on his private signal and the estimates of the other bidders' signals. Bidder 1' s
expected or forecast asking price is:
v"(x, y) = El r"(Y,, P) I X, = x, Y, = yl (3)
where the expectation is taken over Y .^ By affiliation, v"(x, y) is increasing in x and y, ie,
the higher the bidder's private signal, the higher will be his expectation of the resale price.
For the car buyer or the distributor, the forecast asking price is the amount he expects
to be compensated if he were to give up the COE. This is precisely the amount he is willing
to pay to buy a COE from the secondary market, should he fail to win a COE, given current
information. For the speculator, resale profit depends on forecast prices in the secondary
market, which in tum determines his expected asking price. Therefore, bidders' valuations
are linked to expected resale prices. In the transferable COE auction, the relevant willing-
ness to pay is therefore the expected asking price. Given his expected asking price. Bidder
1 chooses a bid b to maximise expected consumer stirplus. We can show that:
PROPOSITION 1: b*(x) = v°(x, x) where v"(x, y) = El r"(Yk, P) IX, = x, Y,, = yyl is a Nash
equilibrium strategy in the uniform-price transferable COE auction.
(Proofs of all the Propositions are available from the authors upon request.)
Each bidder should place a bid equal to his expected asking price v"(x, x), should he
win a COE, assuming that his realised private signal Xj is equal to his kth highest estimate
Y^ of the other bidders' signals. In other words, the bidder should regard himself as a
borderline wirmer.
NON-TRANSFERABLE COE AUCTION
With non-transferable COEs, resale is prohibited (ignoring double-transfers), so the
question of expected asking prices for COEs is irrelevant, and ex post information P is
useless to car buyers to evaluate their willingness to pay to obtain a COE. They wiU have
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to wait for the next tender exercise and hopefully put in a successful bid. With no resale
possibility, Bidder l's expected pay-off wiU be based on his personal valuation V,, and not
on the expected asking price. We can show that:
PROPOSITION 2: b"(x) = v\x, x) where v'(x, y) = El V,l X, = x, Y^ = yl is a Nash
equilibrium bidding strategy in the uniform-price now-transferable auction.
Again, each bidder should bid as if he is a borderline winner. He should place a bid
equal to his conditional valuation v"(x, x), assuming his realised private signal Xj is the kth
highest value among the other bidders' private infonnation. The next result establishes that
given the same set of private information among the bidders, the transferable COE auction
will always lead to higher COE prices compared with the non-transferable COE auction.
PROPOSITION 3: b*(x) > b'(x), so that the COE prices paid .by winning bidders in the
transferable COE auction are greater than those in the non-transferable COE auction.
COE prices in the transferable auction are therefore higher than those in the non-
transferable auction, for the same set of private information observed by the bidders. As
argued earlier, COE prices are higher, largely because of speculation. In fact, the big-time
speculators in COEs turned out to be used-car dealers and factory owners who had recourse
to a large number of employees' identity cards. For an initial outlay of $40,000, the price
of an average used car, a used-car dealer could bid for about ten COEs, depositing half the
bids with the Registry of Vehicles. If successful, he could sell the COEs at a profit of, say,
$2,000 each, making a total of $20,000. This is more attractive than selling a used car.
Furthermore, speculators have an incentive to put in higher bids to push up the COE
prices, in order that the secondary market's expectation of resale prices be raised. This is
because with transferable COEs, bidders must forecast resale prices they may have to pay
to obtain COEs, should they be unsuccessful. These forecasts are based on past COE
prices. In general, the higher the past COE prices and the higher the resale prices, the
higher will be the forecast resale prices. Speculators had such an incentive because the
transferable COEs were valid for three months. If COE prices continue to increase, then the
speculators stand to benefit by selling the older and cheaper COEs at a profit. Checks with
some speculators indicated that this had been their strategy in bidding for transferable
COEs. Not to be outbid, car buyers and distributors, competing with the speculators, had
to raise their bids as well, knowing that if they bought from the secondary market, prices
would be higher.
4. TESTING THE THEORY
The main hypothesis that we wish to test is that COE prices are higher when they are
transferable. The null hypothesis that we seek to reject is that COE prices are lower when
they are transferable. To test the hypothesis, we will look at the data on COE auctions since
the introduction of the vehicle quota system. The one-year experiment on non-transferable
COEs has given us the opportunity to perform a statistical comparison of the COE prices
before and after October 1991.
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DATA
The data used in our study were provided by the Registry of Vehicles of Singapore, for
the period May 1990 to February 1992. We were unable to obtain access to individual bids
and the overall distribution of bids. The data obtained include observations, for all catego-
ries, on the COE premium (QP), the quota (Q), the number of submitted bids (BIDNO),
and the number of successful bids (SUCCESS). The number of successful bids is not
always equal to the quota. In the case of tied bids for tbe last few units, there is nO balloting
to select tbe winner. These unused COEs are added to the quota for the next auction.
Our analysis focuses on the COE auctions in Categories 1 to 4. The reason is simple.
Categories 5 and 7 COEs have remained transferable throughout, and are therefore not the
subject of our study. Bidding in Category 6 was initially beavily influenced by tbe higber
requirements of emission standard for motorcycles; later, the COE premium remained at
$1 from January 1992.' Together, Categories 1 to 4 account for the majority of the COEs
for passenger cars. They account for about 50% of the total quota for each month, for the
period of our study (see Table 1 in the Appendix.)
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
To test the theory, we use the following model:*
y, = p'x, + e,
e, = 5,6,,., + S^e..^  + 838,.3 + S^e,^ + v,
E[v,lz,] = 0, ^ '
where y is the dependent variable; x is a vector of stochastic explanatory variables; z is a
vector of instrumental variables; and P and 8; (i = 1,..., 4) are parameters to be estimated.
The dependent variable in this case is QP and the vector of explanatory variables
includes a constant (k), a dummy for transferability (DUM = 1 for those periods when the
COEs are transferable, and DUM = 0 otherwise), a variable to capture intensity of (excess)
demand (EXCESS = BIDNO/SUCCESS), and a variable to capture the uncertainty during
the auction (R = highest submitted bid minus lowest submitted bid). While we would have
liked to use the variable "variance" to proxy for uncertainty, we have to be content with the
variable range, R, as information on individual bids was not available.
A few remarks are in order. The first observation (May 1990) should also not be
included since it was the first auction and a quarterly one at that, which may have induced
different bidding pattems compared with later auctions. Furthermore, there was a $5,000
(instead of the usual maximum of $2,000) car-registration fee in place from February 1990
to May 1990 to discourage bringing forward the purchase of cars before the quota system
was implemented.
5. Category 8 COEs are only applicable to vehicles subjected to special restrictions on usage
introduced in May 1991. There was insufficient data for our analysis.
6. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the model in Section 3. More aggressive bidding could
be due to more efficient exploitation of ex ante information as contained in S, or a change in the
density function F.
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During the period of our study, the additional registration fee (ARF) - an ownership
tax on all categories of vehicles - was progressively reduced from 175% of the open
market value (OMV) to 160% in November 1990, and eventuaUy to 150% in February
1991. (The Open Market Value of a car comprises the manufacturer's price plus freight and
insurance charges.) While the reduction of the ARF would presumably increase the
willingness to pay and hence higher bids should be expected, we found that these events
were not significant in the estimation of the parameters when dummies for the events were
included in the model.
Also, while we wish to select those relevant independent variables that reflect both
public and private information, we have difficulty doing so for three reasons. First, most
macroeconomic variables are available only at quarterly intervals, while the COE auctions
are held monthly, making the macroeconomic information redundant. Second, the COE
premium itself is likely to be a leading indicator of the state of the economy and other
financial variables, thus rendering these variables useless in trying to explain COE prices.
While there are other qualitative survey indicators that signal the turning point for the
economy, their usefulness in predicting the magnitude has yet to be proven. Finally, the
COE prices are very sensitive to changes in expectations, which in turn affect the demand
for COEs, making prediction difficult.
In view of this, instead of using economic and financial variables that are publicly
available to reflect the state of the economy, we use a direct measure for the intensity of
demand, proxied by the variable EXCESS. Another variable, R, is used to capture the
degree of uncertainty in connection with the private infonnation that is available to the
individual. Any mis-specification is captured by the error term.
In our analysis, we shall treat the car markets in the four categories as separate markets
and estimate each model individually rather than jointly. Estimating the models jointly will
improve efficiency but mis-specifications of any one of the models will have an effect on
the rest. We feel that the loss in efficiency is a small price to pay for the results we
obtained. A priori, we believe that both EXCESS and R should have a positive coefficient.
F'or the dummy variable. Proposition 3 indicates that DUM = 1 should have a positive
coefficient as well. As the results below indicate, this is not always the case.
ESTIMATION
Since x, the vector of stochastic explanatory variables, is endogenous, the appropriate
estimation technique to use here is the Method of Moments (MM). This method will give
us consistent estimates that are robust to distribution assumptions. For efficiency improve-
ments, either the generalised method of moments or the method of maximum likelihood
can be used. However, since we only had a small number of observations (19 to be exact),
we have decided to use the method of Gausian Maximum Likelihood (GML) for efficiency
improvement in the case of adjusting for serial correlation. Instruments are required for
estimation and they are lagged-variables of one to three months of the variables BIDNO,
SUCCESS, QUOTA together with a constant and DUM.
THE RESULTS
The MM estimates are reported in Table 2 in the Appendix. Tests were conducted to
determine if there was any mis-specification. Tests for appropriateness of instrumental
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variables, normality, functional form and heteroscedasticity did not suggest there were
mis-specifications. All these results are reported in Table 2 as well. CUSUM and CUSUMQ
tests were also conducted to detect mis-specifications.
We found that the DUM variable was statistically significant at the 1% level for
Categories 1, 3 and 4. Except for Category 1, the estimates for the dummy variable in the
other models seem to suggest that the COE premia were much lower during the period
when COEs were transferable. The results suggest that Proposition 3 is not supported.
However, from the LM tests for serial correlation, there was evidence to suggest that the
residuals were not free from serial correlation.
For estimation in Categories 2 and 3, we have assumed that the errors follow AR(3)
process with 5, and 82 both constrained to zero. As for Category 4, we have assumed that
the error follows AR(2) with 8, constrained to zero. By making the additional assumption
that the v's are normally distributed, we can have fijlly efficient estimates using the method
of maximum likelihood. The results, reported in Table 3 in the Appendix, are robust to the
various estimation methods and the number of lags used as instrumental variables.
In Categories 2 and 3, the LM tests suggest that the error term should follow an AR(3)
process, with the coefficient of the error term lagged one constrained to zero. Unfortu-
nately, the models fail to converge and we have decided to report the results for the case
where the error term lagged two is constrained to zero as well. The non-convergence could
well be due to the small sample size that we have.
TRANSFERABILITY AND fflGHER PRICES: EVIDENCE
We made the following observations:
(i) the MM and GML estimates for the dummy variable, DUM, are positive in Category
1 and are statistically significant at the 5% level;
(ii) the estimates for Category 2 are statistically significant;
(iii) the estimates for Categories 3 and 4 are statistically significant and negative.
The results suggest that the hypothesis that transferability and speculative activities
resulted in higher prices is only supported in the auction for Category 1 COEs. In Category
2, conversion to non-transferability did not seem to affect bidding behaviour. In Categories
3 and 4, we obtained the counter-intuitive result that bidding is less aggressive under
transferability. While one could argue that the results for Categories 2 to 4 reflect the fact
that bidders have not yet adjusted their bidding strategy after the conversion to non-
transferability, and therefore that Proposition 3 is not refuted, we believe the explanation
lies elsewhere.
5. SPECULATION AND MARKET COMPETITION UNDER THE VEHICLE
QUOTA SYSTEM
As expected, an immediate effect of non-transferability was to reduce speculation.
This is indicated by the BIDNO and EXCESS data, as shown in Table 1 in the Appendix.
For the case of Category 1 COEs, there were, on average, about 230 COEs in each auction.
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Before 1 October 1991, the average number of bids submitted in each month was 858
(ignoring the first auction), with an all-time high of 1,518 in May 1991. After 1 October
1991, the average number of bids submitted was 563. More importantly, the intensity of
demand, as measured by the variable EXCESS, dropped from an average of 3.72 before
non-transferability to 2.78 after non-transferability. The 25% reduction in the intensity of
demand suggests that speculative demand possibly accounted for about a quarter of the
bids for Category 1 COEs in each auction before non-transferability. The corresponding
figures for the other categories are given in Table 4 in the Appendix. Our result for the
variable DUM for Category 1 COEs is consistent with the reduction in the intensity of
demand due to the elimination of speculation.
From Table 4, conversion to non-transferability did not seem to affect the average
BIDNO and average EXCESS for Category 2 COEs for the period under study - an
indication that speculation was perhaps less important in that category, which would
explain why the estimates for the variable DUM were statistically insignificant in that
category. A more plausible explanation for the result may be the fact that many potential
Category 1 car buyers switched to the more expensive cars in Category 2, since the COE
premium accounts for a lower percentage of the price of more expensive cars. The
reduction in speculation in Category 2 may have been offset by this increase in demand.
As in the case of the other categories, there was a similar drop (albeit smaller than that
in the case of Category 1) in the intensity of demand for Categories 3 and 4 COEs. after the
conversion to non-transferability. However, our estimates for DUM were significant and
negative, which contradicted the hypothesis that eradication of speculation should result in
lower COE premiums for a given intensity of demand. We believe that it is the more
intense market competition among our distributors in Categories 2, 3 and 4 after the
conversion to non-transferability which accounted for our results in these categories.
NON-TRANSFERABILITY AND MARKET COMPETITION
In the auctions for COEs. car buyers often let distributors bid on their behalf, because
they feel the distributors have better market information to make a successful bid, and
because of the COE subsidies that the distributors offer as part of the sales package.
According to some car distributors, private bids probably accounted for only about 10% of
the bids in each auction. In effect, the distributors are the major players in the COE
auctions.
Before non-transferability, competition among distributors centred on the level of
COE "subsidies" for car buyers. Distributors could turn to the secondary market to obtain
additional COEs to meet their customers' demand, albeit at a high price. After 1 October
1991. the substantial COE subsidies became less important to the distributors. Since COEs
were necessary for car sales, distributors were now more concerned about not obtaining
enough COEs. Not only did they lose their market shares, but the storage and capital costs
involved in keeping unsold cars can be substantial, not to mention the fhistration faced by
car buyers who are waiting to get their cars. Many distributors resorted to bidding by
proxy, using the names of employees or relatives to obtain COEs and registering new cars
under the proxies' names before the cars had found buyers. Clearly, those distributors who
obtain additional COEs will increase their market shares. Conversion to non-transferabil-
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ity, while eliminating speculation, has meanwhile led to more intense competition among
distributors.
The car market in Category 1 is dominated by the three major distributors for Daihatzu,
Suzuki and Subaru, respectively. As long as their market shares are stable, it is in their
interests not to engage in a bidding war, but to cooperate to keep COE premiums low, since
more costly Category 1 COEs will shift demand to more expensive cars. As Table 5 in the
Appendix indicates, the market for Category 1 cars grew by about 4% between May 1990
and December 1991. This is slower than the rates for Categories 3 and 4. It is unlikely that
distributors for Category 1 cars would bid much more aggressively after speculators have
dropped out. Most distributors believe that prices for Category 1 COEs are unlikely to
exceed $20,000, since the low profit margin effectively puts a ceiling on the bids in that
category. This is bome out by the fact that in each of the auctions in our study, the
maximum bid did not exceed $20,000. '
The relative decline in the car market in Category 1 is due to the existence of the Open
Category COEs. When cars are deregistered, 80% of the COEs created go back into the
category, while the remaining 20% go into the Open Category. The rationale for doing so
is to allow for changes in the composition of the car population. What has happened is that
Open Category COEs are used mainly to register cars in Categories 3 and 4, and less often.
Category 2 cars. This is not a surprising development in view of the small number of COEs
in each auction for Categories 3 and 4. In all the auctions under study, the number of Open
Category COEs in each auction is more than those in Categories 3 and 4 combined.
In the markets for cars belonging to Categories 2, 3 and 4, there are more than ten
major car distributors. With so many competitors, coupled with sealed-bid bidding, the
possibility for collusion is slim. In fact, it is in the interests of each player to bid aggres-
sively in order to maintain his market share, at the very least, since long-term survival
depends on whether he can obtain enough COEs. Since the introduction of the quota
system, there have been several changes in distributorships, as reported in the local press;
the reason for the changes stemmed from poor sales performance.
Distributors must sell a minimum number of cars each month to maintain showrooms
and workshops. If they fail to obtain enough COEs, they will not meet their sales target
until they obtain more COEs in the next round of auctions. Since COEs are non-transfer-
able, there is no secondary market to tum to for COEs in that category. The only possibility
is to practise double-transfer, or to purchase Open Category COEs which are still transfer-
able but are limited in quantity. Faced with the prospect of losing their market share,
distributors would prefer to be more aggressive in their bidding, even though this means a
slimmer profit margin.
If this explanation of the events after the conversion to non-transferability is correct,
one would expect that the demand-dampening effect of eliminating speculation would be
replaced by more aggressive bidding by the distributors. Our estimates for the DUM
variable for Categories 2, 3 and 4 therefore should not be significantly greater than zero.
In fact, our results show that in Category 2, the DUM estimate is statistically insignificant,
while for the other two categories, the DUM estimates are statistically significant and
negative.
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Another piece of evidence on the effect of more aggressive bidding is the comparison
between the changes in the intensity of demand and the COE premium. From Table 6 in the
Appendix, we note that while the intensity of demand in February 1992's auction dropped
by about 47% in Categories 2 and 3, and 64% in Category 3 from the levels in September
199rs auction, the COE premium has, however, increased - most spectacularly in Cat-
egory 3. Since private bidders (including speculators) accounted for a small proportion of
the bids in each auction, particularly after non-transferability was in place, the above
results indicated that distributors bid more aggressively after October 1991.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
While we feel that our explanation of the events up until February 1992 is basically
correct, we also recognise that there are limitations to our analysis. One could perhaps
argue that the rapidly increasing COE premia reflect in part the greater willingness to pay
on the part of bidders, possibly due to the progressive reduction of the Additional Regis-
tration Fee (ARF) for new cars, from 175% of the OMV in November 1990 to 150% in
February 1991. However, allowing for the changes in the ARF in our estimation proved to
be insignificant.
Although COEs are non-transferable after October 1991, it is not illegal to transfer
cars immediately after purchase. This loophole has been exploited by a few big-time
speculators, who continued their trade in COEs by practising double-transfer, ie transfer-
ring both car and COE. Figures from the ROV suggested that 20% of the new cars
registered after October 1991 are meant for double-transfers.
In our study we have discovered that non-transferability of COEs has important
implications for market competition in the car industry. Non-transferability does not
necessarily imply lower COE prices after the switch. Distributors with stronger financial
backing are in a stronger position to bid higher to maintain their market shares. In so doing,
they squeeze the profit of weaker firms, forcing some to leave the industry. This has been
bome out by the disappearance of several inferior car distributors from the industry.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
COE AUCTIONS FOR CATEGORIES 1 TO 4 (MAY 90 TO FEB 92)
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
May 1990
Aug 1990
Sep 1990
Oct 1990
Nov 1990
Dec 1990
Jan 1991
Feb 1991
Mar 1991
Apr 1991
May 1991
Jun 1991
Jul 1991
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
1,441
985
1,004
1,275
302
2,080
904
304
5,030
111
303
5,612
401
278
3,102
486
253
2,001
521
300
2,006
257
250
210
756
246
652
1,038
228
1,202
1,518
181
4,510
1,308
213
7,002
1,214
161
7,004
(5)
(2)
(2)
(3)
(0)
(24)
(1)
(1)
(5)
(28)
(47)
(34)
(73)
8,944
4,555
3,002
4,928
1,412
6,012
3,520
1,328
9,888
2,250
1,500
1,110
1,519
1,283
2,004
2,868
1,211
3,202
2,230
1,362
3,224
1,835
1,167
2,649
1,433
1,160
909
2,569
1,143
1,904
3,972
1,395
5,258
3,073
1,368
7,875
3,131
1,264
8,002
(28)
(4)
(92)
(7)
(4)
(79)
(3)
(0)
(4)
(27)
(1)
(4)
(111)
\,111
852
5,001
797
261
7,238
623
228
11,104
594
266
10,400
111
250
1,120
978
256
4,000
597
255
3,600
381
199
3,001
251
236
210
718
217
1,420
1,082
217
5,610
1,104
180
11,020
927
252
9,178
(5)
(4)
(41)
(39)
(4)
(2)
(0)
(18)
(0)
(1)
(0)
(36)
(0)
330
255
528
257
88
4,550
153
88
5,602
190
88
5,886
116
75
1,502
217
71
2,002
166
73
2,004
103
76
988
147
65
1,004
144
74
800
305
54
3,020
426
53
10,000
350
66
12,047
(15)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(1)
(6)
(9)
(1)
(5)
(0)
(5)
(10)
(2)
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Aug 1991
Sep 1991
Oct 1991*
Nov 1991*
Dec 1991*
Jan 1992*
Feb 1992*
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
BIDNO
SUCCESS
QP
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
(TIES)
875
268 (5)
9,660
680
206(0)
9,508
1,008
200(0)
6,300
586
199 (0)
7,500
447
191 (14)
9,616
393
237 (I)
10,100
380
198 (6)
9,002
2,835
1,481
9,040
3,429
1,367
10,520
3,900
1,369
6,528
3,154
1,400
9,188
3,139
1,459
12,958
2,547
1,387
16,602
1,802
1,338
11,000
(1)
(6)
(9)
(0)
(0)
(1)
(44)
779
213 (3)
12,558
680
216 (5)
13,080
831
208 (14)
10,002
574
216(13)
12,002
311
245 (7)
14,800
658
253 (9)
18,500
361
209 (18)
20,002
264
57(3)
12,742
222
60(1)
13,000
244
45 (14)
12,002
179
80(3)
13,004
193
85(0)
16,788
126
75(0)
19,666
100
77(1)
15,080
Notes: 1. * denotes non-transferable COEs.
2. QUOTA = SUCCESS + TIES, where TIES refer to the minimum number of tied
bids.
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TABLE 2
METHOD OF MOMENTS ESTIMATES FOR THE QUOTA
PREMIUM MODEL
Dependent Variable: QP
Period: Aug 1990 - Feb 1992
Instruments: constant, dummy, success(-l), success(-2), bidno(-l), bidno(-2), quota(-l),
quota(-2), R(-l), R(-2).
Regressor Coefficient
CONSTANT
DUMMY
EXCESS
R
Diagnostic Statistics
R^
R-Bar-Squared
RSS
S.D. of QP
S.E. of regression
Mis-specification Tests
A: Serial Correlation -
chi-squared
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
B: Functional Form -
(1)
C: Normality - Jarque
(2)
D: Heteroscesdasticitj
(1)
E: Sargant's Test for;
(6)
Cat. 1
-5600.4
(1376.6)
2455.3
(848.8)
358.6
(186.4)
.8521
(.0819)
.94
.92
1.24E07
3481.4
978.23
- AR(1) to AR(5)
0.02
0.02
5.49
6.50
6.52
Ramsey's RESET
1.03
; and Bera's Test
1.99
Cat. 2
-3310.2
(5037.4)
-862.9
(1773.8)
2025.4
(1615.1)
.5095
(.1344)
.82
.77
5.62E07
4378.4
2079.0
.48
6.71
8.55
8.73
9.23
Test
1.21
.60
' - Function of Mean's Test
.5376
rv
8.57
3.83
6.79
Cat. 3
1201.1
(3755.3)
-3932.5
(1903.7)
582.3
. (745.9)
.5122
(.1169)
.83
.79
1.02E08
6064.3
2803.7
.72
5.18
9.14
11.0
11.0
.001
.93
.002
7.99
Cat. 4
5839.4
(1424.3)
-6115.8
(1224.3)
-365.93
(327.1)
.5230
(.0761)
.94
.93
4.18E07
6536.7
1793.9
.02
6.24
6.45
6.45
6.49
.09
2.44
.17
9.39
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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TABLE 3
GAUSSIAN MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES WITH RESTRICTED AR
ERROR SPECIFICATION FOR THE QUOTA PREMIUM MODEL
Dependent Variable: QP
Period: Aug 1990 - Feb 1992
Instruments: constant, dummy, success(-l), success(-2), bidno(-l), bidno(-2), quota(-l),
quota(-2), R(-l), R(-2).
Regressor
CONSTANT
DUMMY
EXCESS
R
Parameters of the
U(-2)
U(-3)
Cat. 1
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Autoregressive
N.A.
N.A.
Diagnostic Statistics
R^
R-Bar-Squared
RSS
S.D. of QP
S.E. of regression
Mis-specification'
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Test
A: Sargant's Test for IV
(6) N.A.
Coefficient
Cat. 2
-4376.2
(2726.0)
-364.03
(1252.7)
2289.8
(1195.2)
.5197
(.0890)
Error Specification
0.00
-0.8785
(-2.1608)
.91
.87
2.34E07
4378.4
1613.0
5.25
Cat. 3
1394.4
(4266.9)
-4109.0
(2334.3)
821.89
(777.78)
.4804
(.1296)
0.00
.0357
(.0693)
.85
.78
7.59E07
6064.3
2904.4
7.23
Cat. 4
5729.3
(822.7)
-7114.3
(795.8)
-91.99
(227.3)
.5212
(.0498)
-.111%
(-3.28)
0.00
.97
.96
1.99E07
6535.7
1412.4
7.51
Note: Standard errors and t-ratios are in parentheses for coefficients of the main regression
and parameters of the autoregressive error specification respectively. Due to convergence
problems, we have restricted the coefficient on u(-2) to be zero for Categories 2 and 3.
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TABLE 4
AVERAGE BIDNO AND EXCESS (MAY 1980 TO FEB 1992)
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
Before
After 1
1 October 91
October 91
AV.
AV.
AV.
AV.
BIDNO
EXCESS
BIDNO
EXCESS
858
3.72
563
2.78
2828
2.14
2908
1.95
694
3.06
547
2.45
219
3.33
168
2.58
TABLE 5
CHANGE IN CAR POPULATION FROM MAY 1990 TO DEC 1991
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Aggregate
Registration
Deregistration
Net Change
Population at May 90
Percentage Change
2,928
1,280
1,648
40,820
4.04%
19,291
15,071
4,220
164,519
2.56 %
5,957
1,763
4,194
32,529
12.89 %
1,635
443
1,192
6,854
17.39 %
29,811
18,557
11,254
244,722
4.60 %
Source: Registry of Vehicles (Singapore)
TABLE 6
COE AUCTION FOR SEP 1991 AND FEB 1992
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
Sep 1991
Feb 1992
% Change in
% Change in
EXCESS
QP
EXCESS
QP
EXCESS
QP
3.30
9,508
1.91
9,002
^ 2 . 1 2 %
-5.32 %
2.51
10,520
1.30
11,000
-48.21 %
4.56 %
3.15
13,080
1.73
20,002
-45.08 %
52.92 %
3.7
13,000
1.30
15,080
-64.86%
16.00 %
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